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We did a systematic review and meta-analysis to investigate 
the magnitude and specificity of the “jumping to conclusions” 
(JTC) bias in psychosis and delusions. We examined the 
extent to which people with psychosis, and people with delu-
sions specifically, required less information before making 
decisions. We examined (1) the average amount of informa-
tion required to make a decision and (2) numbers who dem-
onstrated an extreme JTC bias, as assessed by the “beads 
task.” We compared people with psychosis to people with and 
without nonpsychotic mental health problems, and people with 
psychosis with and without delusions. We examined whether 
reduced data-gathering was associated with increased delusion 
severity. We identified 55 relevant studies, and acquired previ-
ously unpublished data from 16 authors. People with psychosis 
required significantly less information to make decisions than 
healthy individuals (k = 33, N = 1935, g = −0.53, 95% CI 
−0.69, −0.36) and those with nonpsychotic mental health prob-
lems (k = 13, N = 667, g = −0.58, 95% CI −0.80, −0.35). The 
odds of extreme responding in psychosis were between 4 and 6 
times higher than the odds of extreme responding by healthy 
participants and participants with nonpsychotic mental health 
problems. The JTC bias was linked to a greater probability of 
delusion occurrence in psychosis (k = 14, N = 770, OR 1.52, 
95% CI 1.12, 2.07). There was a trend-level inverse association 
between data-gathering and delusion severity (k = 18; N = 818; 
r = −.10, 95% CI −0.21, 0.02). Hence, nonaffective psycho-
sis is characterized by a hasty decision-making style, which is 
linked to an increased probability of delusions.
Key words: beads task/schizophrenia/delusions/ 
reasoning/jumping to conclusions
Introduction
Delusions are fixed beliefs that are not amenable to 
change in light of counterevidence. Grandiosity and 
paranoia are common themes1 and such beliefs are a 
hallmark feature of diagnoses like schizophrenia and 
delusional disorder. Delusions are often preoccupying, 
distressing, and disabling to the holder or those around 
the person, and show only modest response to medica-
tion2 or talking therapies such as Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy.3 In order to improve treatment effectiveness, 
research has focussed on identifying and understanding 
psychological processes that may underlie delusion for-
mation and maintenance. A key finding to emerge is that 
people with delusions appear to make decisions on the 
basis of less evidence than healthy individuals or people 
with nonpsychotic mental health problems.4 This deci-
sion-making style has been referred to as the “jumping to 
conclusions” (JTC) bias and there is preliminary evidence 
that it is demonstrated by nonclinical participants who 
score highly for delusional ideation5; in those at risk of 
developing psychosis6; as well as in first-degree relatives 
of people with psychosis.7
Given these findings, JTC plays a central role in numer-
ous psychological and neuropsychological theories of 
delusions as this bias may lead to the premature accep-
tance of implausible ideas and perhaps prevent consider-
ation of more realistic alternative explanations of events.8 
The JTC bias has been targeted in specific reasoning 
interventions, in the hope that modifying it may reduce 
delusional ideation.9 However, the magnitude and preva-
lence of the JTC bias in psychosis has yet to be system-
atically quantified. Moreover, despite almost 3 decades 
of research, the specificity of the JTC bias to delusions, 
rather than illness severity or psychosis per se, remains 
unclear.
The experimental paradigm most commonly used to 
assess the JTC bias is known as the “beads task.”10 This 
task involves showing participants 2 jars of beads in 
equal but opposite ratios, such as 85 red and 15 blue and 
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vice versa. Both jars are then hidden, and the participant 
is told that individual beads are drawn consecutively from 
1 jar. The beads are actually presented in a prespecified 
sequence. The task of the participant is to decide from 
which jar beads are being drawn. Two key outcome vari-
ables from this type of study are the number of beads 
drawn before a decision is made (“draws to decision”; 
DTD) and the proportion of “extreme responders.” This 
is the number of people who make a decision on the basis 
of 2 or fewer beads, which is taken to indicate the presence 
of a marked JTC bias. Variations of this task have pre-
sented the materials on computer,11 made the task harder 
(using 60:40 ratio for instance,12), and have manipulated 
the content to make it less abstract,13,14 more personally 
relevant,15 socially relevant,16 or emotionally laden.12
The role of the JTC bias in psychosis has been sub-
ject to numerous narrative reviews (ie, 1,4,17) but only 2 
systematic meta-analyses. The first, by Fine and col-
leagues,18 answered several important questions regard-
ing the nature of the JTC bias in an established psychosis 
population, and usefully established the importance of 
JTC and DTD as key outcome variables in this field but 
the precision of their estimates was limited by inclusion 
of only 12 small studies, and there was no systematic 
assessment of study or outcome quality. Since this time, 
there have been a large number of studies investigating 
decision-making and delusions published (for a narrative 
review see Freeman and Garety8) meaning a definitive 
estimate of any psychosis or delusion-attributable differ-
ences in data-gathering is both possible and timely.
A second meta-analysis, by Ross and colleagues,19 was 
published in early 2015. This analysis of participant-
level data from 23 nonclinical samples (N = 1754) and 8 
samples with current delusions (N = 262) studies found 
a small relationship between DTD and self  reported 
delusional ideation measured using the Peters Delusion 
Inventory (PDI; 20) (nonclinical r  =  −.10; clinical cur-
rent delusions r = −.12). Although Ross and colleagues 
examined the moderating role of study design variables, 
they did not report a systematic assessment of study or 
outcome quality, and did not examine whether extreme 
responding was associated with greater delusion prone-
ness or was more prevalent in people with delusions. 
The high ratio of nonclinical to clinical studies and the 
relatively low number of clinical participants means we 
are cautious in generalising their findings to people with 
established psychosis and a clinically focussed analysis of 
the research is clearly indicated.
The aim of the current systematic review and meta-
analysis was to provide an assessment of (1) the extent 
to which people with nonaffective psychosis demonstrate 
an increased data gathering bias, as measured by both 
average “draws to decision” and the number of extreme 
responders, and (2) whether and to what extent this bias is 
specific to delusions rather than psychosis or illness sever-
ity. We used published and unpublished data to compare 
people with psychosis to those with and without other 
mental health problems, and we compared people with 
psychosis who had and did not have current delusions. 
We examined whether reduced data-gathering was associ-
ated with delusion severity, and we carried out a number 
of pre-specified moderator analyses to examine the effect 
of study quality and design variables on the overall esti-
mates of effect.
Methods
Search Strategy
Publication databases and previous reviews were searched 
independently by 2 reviewers (PT and PH) up to March 
2014, and updated by SW in January 2015. Studies were 
eligible for inclusion if  they measured DTD or JTC using 
the beads tasks or one conceptually similar (such as the 
fishes in lakes task, 13) in (1) people with established psy-
chosis and (2) people with nonpsychotic mental health 
problems or healthy participants. Studies comparing peo-
ple with psychosis who had current delusions to people 
with psychosis who did not have delusions were also eli-
gible. The psychosis and delusions groups consisted only 
of those participants who had a diagnosis of nonaffective 
psychosis. Cross-sectional baseline data were extracted 
from longitudinal studies, experimental manipulation 
studies, or reports of randomized controlled trials, and 
authors were contacted in every case where usable but 
unpublished data were thought to exist. Studies without 
control group data were eligible for inclusion in the anal-
yses of DTD/JTC and delusion severity. Further details 
of our search strategy and inclusion and exclusion cri-
teria are provided in our protocol in the supplementary 
material and a previous publication.21
Data Extraction and Outcomes
Two reviewers independently extracted data from each 
study using a spreadsheet. Our primary outcomes were (1) 
the average draws to decision and (2) the number of peo-
ple who demonstrated an extreme JTC bias. We defined 
the latter as the number of people choosing to make a 
decision after either 2 beads or 1 bead (where this is what 
is reported by the authors), with 2 beads being preferable. 
For both outcomes we prioritized performance on trials 
where the ratio of visible bead colour (or equivalent) was 
85:15. If not available we used, in order of preference, 
80:20, 90:10, or 60:40. We made an a priori decision to 
select 85:15 as our preference for inclusion into the meta-
analysis as we anticipated this would be the most prevalent 
ratio used across studies. Where results for an 85:15 ratio 
were provided these were always used rather than results 
for other ratios. Also, where data from multiple trials all 
using 85:15 were provided we used the average result.
We analysed data from trials where the information 
to be gathered was emotionally neutral (eg, number of 
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beads from a jar, or number of fish from a lake) but if  
this was not available we used data from “salient” trials, 
where participants are asked to make decisions regarding 
the source of emotionally salient material (eg, negative or 
positive survey responses, 12).
For the analysis of differences in DTD, we extracted 
mean DTD scores per group and the associated SD to 
allow calculation of the weighted (WMD) and standard-
ized mean difference (SMD). Missing SDs were, where 
possible, calculated from t test values, P-values, F-values, 
SEs or confidence intervals using equations specified in 
the Cochrane Handbook22 or Borenstein and colleagues.23 
If  neither means and SDs were reported, then we used the 
reported effect size measures to calculate SMD.
For the analyses of extreme-responding, we used the 
number of participants who jumped to conclusions as 
the numerator, and number who entered the study group 
as the denominator. Correlation coefficients and related 
variance parameters were extracted for the analysis of 
DTD and delusion severity. For the analysis of JTC and 
delusions we used, for each study: (1) mean delusions 
ratings and associated SDs for extreme and nonextreme 
responders and (2) number of people with psychosis 
and delusions who show extreme responding and num-
ber of people with psychosis without current delusions 
who show extreme responding. Both sets of figures were 
then converted to ORs and included in the meta-analysis 
together.
Meta-Analytic Calculations
Both Hedges’s g SMD and the WMD were used as met-
rics of effect size for group differences in DTD. For group 
differences in extreme responding, odds ratio (OR) and 
absolute risk difference were used. When a study had 2 or 
more relevant groups, we combined the data using meth-
ods described in the Cochrane Handbook.22
Random-effects meta-analyses were undertaken using 
the DerSimonian and Laird24 estimator. For all outcomes 
with I2 <40%, we carried out a sensitivity analysis using a 
fixed effects analysis but this made no substantive differ-
ence to the results. Notably, the Profile-Likelihood esti-
mator may have better properties than the DerSimonian 
and Laird method in some contexts (cases of extreme 
nonnormal data, 25). We repeated all main analyses where 
heterogeneity was present with this method and did not 
observe any substantial deviations from the reported 
results. Analyses were undertaken using MetaXL26 and 
STATA version 9.27
As mentioned, a number of studies provided mean 
delusion ratings and SDs for extreme and nonextreme 
responders. For these, we calculated the SMD and 
converted this to an OR following the steps outlined 
by Borenstein and colleagues.23 These ORs were then 
included in the meta-analysis of JTC and delusions, 
which also included ORs derived from studies reporting 
rates of extreme responding in people with psychosis who 
had delusions vs those who were delusion-free.
For the analysis of the relationship between DTD and 
delusion severity, Pearson’s correlations were converted 
into Fisher’s Z.23 Spearman’s correlations were first con-
verted into approximate Pearson’s correlations as outlined 
in Rupinski and Dunlap.28 In 3 cases where correlations 
were not available in the original paper or provided, they 
were taken from Ross and colleagues.19 Notably, Ross and 
colleagues derive their correlations by combining results 
across difficulty conditions (ie, 85:15 and 60:40 ratio), 
which is in contrast to the other correlations reported 
here which are based on a particular version of the task. 
We repeated the analysis comparing correlations between 
DTD and delusions exchanging the effect sizes obtained 
from the original papers with those reported in Ross 
et al19 and found this made minimal difference to the final 
aggregated effect size obtained (Fz = −.09 in both cases).
Moderator and Sensitivity Analyses
Three prespecified methodological moderators of effect 
size were examined: (1) matching of groups, (2) use of 
blinding, (3) use of practice trials. These moderators were 
examined for the 2 largest analyses, (1) DTD for psychosis 
vs nonclinical controls and (2) the number who demon-
strate a JTC bias in samples with experiences of psycho-
sis vs controls. The numbers of studies contributing to 
the other 4 comparisons were smaller and so it would not 
be possible to look at moderators with the same level of 
precision. It was noticed that for the studies comparing 
groups by the number of participants who demonstrated 
a JTC bias there was variation between using either 1 
bead or 2 beads as a cut-off  for indicating a JTC bias. 
We therefore included this variable (1 vs 2 beads) as an 
additional moderator. Random effects meta-regression 
was used to test these moderator effects via STATA’s 
METAREG command, which adopts a restricted max-
imum-likelihood estimator.29
Risk of Bias and Study Quality
The methodological quality of all studies was assessed 
independently by 2 raters using an adapted version of 
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality assess-
ment tool (AHRQ; see supplementary material or Taylor 
et al21). This tool allows for the consistent and transpar-
ent judgement of study quality parameters such as degree 
of participant matching, sample size, recruitment proce-
dures and adequate reporting.
The overall quality of the individual outcomes was 
assessed using an adapted version of the Grading of 
Recommendations Assessment, Development and 
Evaluation (GRADE) approach. The overall GRADE 
rating (whether high, moderate, low or very low quality) 
incorporated considerations of quality of data, publica-
tion bias, inconsistency and imprecision. Overall data 
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quality was assessed by using the distribution of AHRQ 
ratings for studies contributing to that particular out-
come. Publication bias was assessed using funnel plots 
for all outcomes with ≥10 studies, following recommen-
dations by Sterne, Egger and Moher.30 Inconsistency was 
assessed via inspection of heterogeneity and overall direc-
tion and magnitude of effect, and imprecision by inspec-
tion of effect size, confidence intervals and overall N 
contributing to the analyses. The specific criteria we used 
for making AHRQ and GRADE ratings are detailed in 
the supplementary material.
Registration and Peer-Review of Protocol and 
Subsequent Changes
The review protocol was peer-reviewed, published21 
and registered in the public domain (PROSPERO 
Registration CRD42014007603) before searches, data 
extraction and analysis were conducted. Subsequent 
changes included the decision to analyse the compari-
son between the psychosis sample with nonclinical and 
clinical control groups separately rather than combin-
ing data from these nonclinical and clinical control 
groups. This decision was made prior to analyses being 
undertaken, as it was felt it would provide a greater 
insight into the JTC effect. Furthermore an additional 
moderator analysis (whether JTC based on 1 or 2 
beads) was included. Some planned moderator analyses 
were dropped due to insufficient data, including con-
sideration of  differences in phase of  psychosis (ie, first 
episode vs more established and chronic difficulties) 
and whether delusions were current or remitted. The 
effect of  different versions of  the task (salient vs non-
salient; easy vs hard) will be the focus of  a subsequent 
paper. Further changes are detailed in the supplemen-
tary material.
Results
As shown in figure  1, we identified 55 relevant studies. 
Twelve researchers provided additional information that 
was not included in their original article and new, unpub-
lished data were provided by 4 authors. Characteristics 
of included studies and participant demographics are 
provided in the supplementary material. The majority 
of studies took place in the United Kingdom, with the 
Fig. 1. PRISMA flowchart.
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remainder occurring in Australia, Canada, Germany, 
United States, and Hong Kong. A list of excluded studies, 
with reasons for exclusion, is provided in the supplemen-
tary material. In many cases the studies were excluded if  
they did not use a beads type task but another reasoning 
task, or they reported data that had already been reported 
as part of another study.
Risk of Bias
The overall AHRQ assessment is presented in table 1, and 
overall GRADE ratings for each outcome are provided 
in the right-hand column of table 2. A consistent prob-
lem with the studies was a lack of a priori sample size 
justification. Many studies were small and underpowered 
to detect with adequate power effect sizes of seemingly 
theoretical significance. With notable exceptions,31–33 the 
vast majority of studies did not take steps to mask par-
ticipant diagnoses from raters, thus increasing the risk 
of rater bias and expectancy effects. We judged this to 
be more problematic for studies using the manual rather 
than computerized versions of the beads task, where 
experimenter expectations could more easily influence 
responding.
Most studies matched participants on key variables 
such as age and gender, provided adequate information 
regarding sample characteristics and used valid and reli-
able measures to rate psychotic symptoms and establish 
diagnosis. Although all trials used the beads task or 
equivalent to assess JTC (this was an inclusion criteria), 
most did not provide participants with a practice trial, 
which is recommended to minimise the confounding 
effects of confusion regarding task instructions.34
Draws to Decision
As shown in Table  2, there was moderate quality evi-
dence that people with psychosis required significantly 
less information to form conclusions than both healthy 
participants and participants with nonpsychotic mental 
health problems. The differences were moderate in mag-
nitude (see figure  2), and corresponded to people with 
psychosis requiring, on average, 1·4 to 1·7 fewer beads to 
make a decision.
People with delusions required significantly less informa-
tion than people with psychosis who did not have delusions, 
but the difference was small and the estimate imprecise. 
Those with current delusions required on average 0·6 fewer 
beads to make a decision than those without. A  small 
trend-level inverse correlation was observed between delu-
sion severity and DTD for those with delusions, but this 
was affected by significant heterogeneity and imprecision.
Extreme Responding
Moderate quality evidence suggested the odds of extreme 
responding in people with psychosis were, respectively, 
almost 4 times and 6 times higher than the odds of extreme 
responding by healthy participants and participants with 
nonpsychotic mental health problems. Approximately 
29% of healthy participants and 38% of people with 
nonpsychotic mental health problems made a decision 
after 1–2 beads, compared to 48% to 60% of people with 
psychosis. There was also moderate quality evidence of a 
small significant association between extreme responding 
and delusions in people with psychosis (figure 3).
Moderator Analyses
Whilst blinding of researcher to participant status (eg, 
psychosis or control) had been pre-specified as a poten-
tial moderator of interest, only 3 studies31–33 reported 
using blinding therefore this analysis was not possible. 
Results of the moderator analyses for the other variables 
are presented in table 3. None were significant with the 
exception of the presence of multiple or practice trials 
when the outcome was extreme responding (psychosis vs 
nonclinical control). The OR changed from 3.01 to 6.69 
between studies without practice or multiple trials and 
those with practice or multiple trials.
Publication Bias
Inspection of funnel plots did not reveal evidence of pub-
lication bias (see supplementary material).
Discussion
Our analysis confirms that people with nonaffective psy-
chosis require less evidence to make decisions, and are 
more likely to make extreme decisions, than both healthy 
participants and participants with other types of men-
tal health problems. This latter finding provides good 
evidence that the JTC bias is specifically associated with 
psychosis. That this bias also involves a degree of delu-
sion-specificity is supported by the finding that those with 
current delusions require less information to make deci-
sions than those without, and by the significant associa-
tion between extreme responding and delusions. Although 
only small delusion-specific effects were observed, this is 
not unexpected if  we consider people with psychosis to 
have a generally increased vulnerability to forming delu-
sions, even when not currently delusional. Alternatively, 
that a large number of healthy participants demonstrate 
an extreme responding style,8,18 and that 40%–50% of 
those with psychosis do not,8 indicates JTC is neither a 
sufficient or necessary cause of psychosis or delusions. 
Overall, the evidence is largely consistent with Garety 
and Freeman’s suggestion that the JTC bias may act as a 
“trait representing liability to delusions” (p.329: 17).
The inverse correlation between delusion severity and 
draws to decision was small and of only trend-level sig-
nificance. This may be a result of studies requiring partic-
ipants to have a certain severity of delusions before study 
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Table 1. Overview of Assessment of Study Methodological Quality
Study Ref
Unbiased 
Selection of 
Cohort?
Selection 
Minimises  
Baseline 
Differences 
in Prognostic 
Factors?a
Sample Size 
Calculation?
Adequate 
Description 
of the 
Cohort?
Validated 
Method for 
Ascertaining 
Psychosis or 
Delusions?
Validated 
Methods for 
Ascertaining 
jumping to 
conclusions?
Outcome 
Assessments 
Blind to 
Clinical 
Status?
Missing 
Data Low or 
Adequately 
Handled?
Andreou (2013) Partial Yes No Yes Partial Partial Partialc Yes
Andreou (unpublished) Partial Yes Nob Yes Yes Partial Partialc,d No
Balzan (2012) Unclear Yes No Yes Yes Yes Partialc Yes
Balzan (unpublished) Unclear No No Yes Yes Unclear No Unclear
Baskak (2015) Partial Yes No Yes Partial Yes Partialc Yes
Bentall (2009) Yes Partial No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Buck (2012) Yes — No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Colbert (2010) Partial No No Yes Partial Partial Partialc Yes
Conway (2002) Unclear Yes No No Partial Yes No Yes
Dudley (1997a) Yes Yes No Partial No Yes Partialc Yes
Dudley (1997b) Partial Yes No Partial No Yes Partialc Yes
Dudley (2011) Yes Yes No Partial Partial Yes Partialc Yes
Evans (2012) Yes Yes No Partial Partial Yes Partialc Yes
Falcone (2014) Yes No No Yes Yes Partial Partialc Yes
Fear (1997) Partial No No Partial Partial Partial Partialc Partial
Fraser (2006) Unclear Partial Yes Partial Partial Yes No Yes
Garety (1991) Partial Yes No Partial No Partial No Unclear
Garety (2013a) Partial — No Partial Yes Partial Partialc Yes
Garety (2013b) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Partialc Yes
Huq (1988) Partial Partial No Partial No Partial No Yes
Jacobsen (2012) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial No Yes
Krug (2014) Yes No No Partial Yes Yes Partialc Unclear
Langdon (2010) Yes Yes No Partial Yes Partial Partialc Yes
Langdon (2014) Partial Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Lim (2012) Yes Yes No Yes Partial Partial No Yes
Lincoln (2010) Partial Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
McKay (2007) Yes Yes No Yes Partial Yes No Yes
Menon (2006a, Study 1) Partial Yes No Yes Yes Yes Partial Partial
Menon (2008) Yes — No Yes Yes Partial No Yes
Menon (2013) Partial Yes No Yes Yes Partial No Unclear
Moore (2006) Partial Yes No Yes Yes Partial No Partial
Moritz (2005) Partial Yes No Yes Yes Partial Partialc Yes
Moritz (2007) Partial Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Moritz (2011) Partial Yes No Yes Yes Partial Partialc No
Mortimer (1996) Partial — No No Yes Partial Yes Yes
Ochoa (2014) Yes Yes No Partial Yes Partial No No
Ochoa (unpublished) Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Orem (2009) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Ormrod (2012) Yes Partial No Partial Partial Partial Partialc Yes
Peters (2006) Yes No No Partial Partial Partial No Yes
Peters (2008) Partial Yes No Partial Partial Partial No Yes
Rausch (2014) Partial Yes No Yes Yes Yes Partialc Yes
Ross (2011) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial Partialc Yes
So (2012, PRP Study 4) Yes — Nob Yes Yes Partial Partialc No
So (2014) Partial — No No Yes Partial Partialc Yes
So (2015) Yes No No Yes Partial Partial No Yes
Startup (2008) Partial Yes No Yes Yes Partial No Yes
Van Dael (2006, CoP Study 1) Yes No Yes Yes Yes Partial Partialc Yes
Van der Gaag (2013) Unclear Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Partial Unclear Yes
Westermann (unpublished) Unclear Partial Unclear Partial Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Waller (2011) Yes Unclear No Yes Yes Partial No Yes
Warman (2007) Partial No No Yes Partial Yes No Yes
Warman (2013) Partial — No Yes Yes Partial No Yes
Wittorf (2012) Yes Partial No Yes Yes Partial Partialc Yes
Young (1997) Partial Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: aGroup comparison studies only.
bJTC a secondary outcome so power calculation would not be expected.
cComputerized beads classified as partial blindness, since relatively less researcher involvement in comparison to manual beads tasks.
dRaters were blind to treatment allocation, but not clinical status.
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Fig. 2. Forest plots for analyses of draws to decision (DTD). (A) Forest plot for comparison of psychosis group vs nonclinical control on 
DTD. (B) Forest plot for comparison of psychosis group vs clinical control on DTD. (C) Forest plot for comparison of individuals with 
psychosis and delusions vs those with without current delusions on DTD (mean differences). (D) Correlation between draws to decisions 
and delusion severity in people with psychosis and delusions.
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entry that may have artificially constrained variance in 
delusion ratings. Nonetheless, our results replicate those 
of Ross and colleagues who found only a small nonsig-
nificant association between self  reported delusional 
ideation and draws to decision in their meta-analysis of 
clinical samples who reported current delusional beliefs.19
The results of the moderator analyses indicated the 
importance of practice, and multiple trials in the like-
lihood of people with psychosis demonstrating JTC. 
Previous work has shown that people with psychosis 
may perform poorly on the beads task owing to mis-
comprehension of the tasks demands.34 Our finding may 
mean that with more practice or multiple trials there is 
less chance of miscomprehension and we are seeing a 
more representative picture of performance. There was 
no evidence for the contribution of other hypothesized 
moderators, and whether 1 or 2 beads is used seems to be 
of little importance, and both are measures of extreme 
responding.
Does Hasty Decision Making Cause Psychosis and 
Delusions?
According to Bradford Hill’s influential criteria, claims 
of  causation are more likely to be justified if  the asso-
ciation between the relevant variables is specific, strong 
C
D
Fig. 2. Continued
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A
B
C
Fig. 3. Forest plots for analyses of extreme responding (JTC). (A) Forest plot for comparison of psychosis group vs nonclinical control 
on number who demonstrate extreme responding. (B) Forest plot for comparison of psychosis group vs clinical control on number who 
demonstrate extreme responding. (C) Forest plot for comparison of individuals with psychosis and delusions vs those with without 
current delusions on number who demonstrate extreme responding.
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and consistent across different populations, settings and 
paradigms.35 Although the relationship between JTC 
and psychosis appears to largely satisfy these criteria, 
the relationship with delusions is weaker and arguments 
both for and against specificity can be made. That the 
odds of  extreme responding in psychosis (OR 3.82, 95% 
CI 2.69, 5.43 vs healthy participants) are higher than 
those for childhood adversity in psychosis (OR 2.78, 
95% CI 2.34, 3.31,36) illustrates the strength of  the rela-
tionship. That almost 90% of  the 33 studies included in 
our largest analysis found data-gathering to be reduced 
in psychosis, despite variation in country, population 
and methodologies, is evidence for consistency. The cen-
tral role given to JTC in several cognitive and neuropsy-
chological models of  psychotic symptoms may satisfy 
Bradford Hill’s additional proposals that claims of  cau-
sality are more likely to be justified if  they fit with exist-
ing theory and facts.
Bradford Hill35 also noted that a causal claim is more 
likely to be true if  the hypothesized causal factor precedes 
the event of interest, if  there is a dose-response relation-
ship between the two, and if  the claim is supported by 
experimental evidence. Whether JTC precedes psychosis 
or delusions remains unclear since no studies, as far as we 
know, have examined the long-term outcome of healthy 
individuals who demonstrate a JTC bias. Findings of 
temporal relationships are mixed in clinical populations, 
with JTC being associated with psychosis or delusion 
severity at follow-up in some studies37–41 but not oth-
ers.42,43 Three experimental studies have found that JTC 
interventions led to reductions in both JTC and delusion 
severity,9,44,45 but one found no evidence that the reduc-
tion in JTC mediated the change in delusional ideation 
after adjusting for baseline confounders.9
Recommendations
Future research should consider the causes of the JTC 
bias (see ref.8 for a review) and whether and how it is 
linked to negative symptoms,33 insight,46 neurocognitive 
factors such as IQ,47 working memory,48 prognosis and 
treatment response. More broadly, studies investigating 
the role of JTC in relation to other known causes and 
mediators of psychotic symptoms such as childhood 
adversity, urbanicity, cannabis use, and genetic predispo-
sition would be valuable.
Firmer conclusions about the potential causal role of 
JTC in psychosis and delusions require adequately pow-
ered longitudinal studies focused on understanding both 
the temporal sequence of JTC and psychotic symptoms 
and the development and consequences of hasty deci-
sion-making in the general population. Suitably-powered 
randomized controlled trials of JTC manipulation are 
essential for testing causal claims, and these should con-
sider comparing the effects on delusions of different 
intensities of JTC-focused interventions. Although such 
studies will require large samples, this could be offset by 
enriching the sample—ie, randomising only those who 
display both delusions and extreme responding.
Future observational and experimental studies of the 
JTC bias in psychosis would benefit from pre-registration 
of their hypotheses and methods in the public domain. 
As with clinical trials, this will allow greater transpar-
ency and assessment of selective reporting bias, as well 
as differentiation of a priori and post hoc hypothesis 
testing. In our main analysis 31/33 studies were under-
powered to detect small (d = 0.2) and medium (d = 0.5) 
effect sizes (n = 394 and 64 per group respectively). We 
therefore recommend that future studies implement and 
adhere to a priori calculations of sample size, and that 
these provide sufficient power to detect effects of theo-
retical significance. To minimise risk of bias, JTC stud-
ies should incorporate rater blinding and automated JTC 
tasks where possible. Practice trials should be used to 
avoid participant miscomprehension and greater atten-
tion should be given to careful matching of participants 
on key demographic variables (age, gender, education, 
ethnicity). Multiple measures (ideally self  report and 
observer completed) of delusional beliefs, and psychotic 
symptoms would be helpful.
Strengths and Limitations
A particular strength of our study was our success in 
receiving unpublished and new data. We were able to 
contact all authors except 2 from initial searches in 
order to obtain extra information. Twelve authors pro-
vided unpublished extra details from published articles 
(eg, clarification over task used, correlations, and study 
design). Four authors were able to provide new, currently 
unpublished data. In addition to this, the benefit of having 
the protocol for this systematic review and meta-analysis 
Table 3. Result of Meta-Regression Moderator Analyses
Analysis Moderator N B (SE) P
DTD: psychosis 
vs. nonclinical 
controls
Matching  
of groups
22/32 −0.18 (0.19) .36
Multiple/ 
practice trials
17/32 −0.06 (0.18) .74
N OR (SE) p
Number who 
JTC: psychosis 
vs nonclinical 
controls
Matching  
of groups
13/21 1.32 (0.44) .41
Multiple/ 
practice trials
8/21 2.17 (0.67) .02
One vs 2 bead 
cut-off
15/21 0.63 (0.28) .32
Note: All moderators binary, 0 = No matching, multiple/practice 
trials or one-bead cut-off. N represents number of studies where 
the moderator = 1.
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published21 was such that several authors contacted the 
corresponding author with their work that was either in 
print or soon to be published.
However, resource constraints meant we were limited to 
English language studies. The variety of different hypoth-
eses being assessed in the included studies meant that 
usable JTC data were not always adequately reported. 
We were able to resolve queries in a number of cases via 
correspondence with authors, but not all. We think it is 
unlikely that data excluded for this reason would have 
had a substantial impact upon the reported effect sizes, 
since most of these were relatively robust and precise.
Of course, our analysis is a synthesis and summary of 
reported effect sizes. We did not carry out a meta-analysis 
of individual participant data, which is an approach that 
may help reduce the risk of selective reporting bias.19 It 
is important to note as well that our review has not been 
able to raise and address the theoretical or methodologi-
cal issues associated with understanding reasoning and 
delusions. The discussion of these points is important 
and is given fuller consideration elsewhere.49 We have 
been unable to comment on whether the findings in the 
present study support a particular theory as to what leads 
people with psychosis and delusions to exhibit this data 
gathering bias. Moreover, we have been unable to engage 
in discussion on the challenges of undertaking research 
investigating reasoning in people with and without delu-
sions. Briefly, in terms of context, the value of the beads 
task was that it involves reasoning about content that is 
seemingly unconnected to the content of the delusional 
belief. However, this has limitations as well, in that it 
may only to a limited degree reflect the actual reasoning 
involved in delusion formation and maintenance.
We recognise as well that the measurement of psycho-
sis and delusions differed between studies. We considered 
this in our assessment of study and outcome quality. 
Importantly, 6 out of 33 included studies (18%) contrib-
uting to our largest analysis relied on chart assessment or 
diagnosis of referring clinician rather than a standard-
ized observer interview based assessment.
Finally, there were an insufficient number of studies 
with required methodological features (eg, researcher 
blinding), which meant we were unable to conduct a num-
ber of planned moderator analyses.
Conclusion
Our review provides definitive evidence that people with 
psychosis make decisions on the basis of less evidence, 
and have a more extreme reasoning style than people 
with other mental health conditions or healthy controls. 
This is linked to a greater probability of having delusions. 
Although hasty decision making is not necessary or suf-
ficient for delusional beliefs, it may still play a causal or 
mediating role, and given the clear association targeting 
this style may help reduce delusional ideation in psychosis.
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